

# Access Permission Contracts for Scripting Languages

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# Scripting Languages are Widely Used

Scripting languages provide

- simple access to powerful libraries
- end user programmability  
(simple concepts, dynamicity)
- quick combination of scripts
- quick development and evolution



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## Research Question

- What does it take to write and maintain reliable programs in a scripting language?
- What tools are useful?

# Our Specimen: JavaScript

JavaScript is the language of the Web



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# Typical Scenario: Program Maintenance

- Programmer inherits reams of JavaScript code
- Task
  - Change / extend existing functionality
  - Implement a new feature
  - Fix a bug

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  - Change / extend existing functionality
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  - Fix a bug
- **Not** supported by a structured namespace ...

# Maintenance Questions

## Program Understanding: Exploring Operations

- What is the public interface?
- What are the signatures?
- What changes are inflicted on the object graph?



# Scenarios

## Specification Levels for an Operation

1. The programmer provides the code
2. The programmer provides a type signature
3. The programmer provides a type signature with effects
4. The programmer provides a full specification

# JSConTest: Tool Support for **Partial Specifications**

## Overview

- Type signatures and contracts for JavaScript with monitoring and random testing
- Effects for JavaScript:  
access permission contracts
- Effect inference

# Type Signatures and Contracts

```
1  /*c int → int */
2  function f(x) { return 2 * x; };
3
4  /*c (int,int) → boolean */
5  function p(x,y) {
6    if (x != y) {
7      if (f(x) == x + 10) return "false"; // contract violation
8    };
9    return true;
10 };
```

- contracts are checked / monitored at run time
- violations are flagged, e.g., if f or p is called on non-integer argument or if p does not return a boolean.

# Object Types

An object type having at least the properties width, height, and background.

```
1 /*c ({width: int, height: int; background: string}) → undefined */  
2 function createCanvas(arg) {  
3   ... arg.width * arg.height * screen.DEPTH ...  
4 }
```

# Object Types

An object type having at least the properties width, height, and background.

```
1 /*c ({width: int, height: int; background: string}) → undefined */  
2 function createCanvas(arg) {  
3   ... arg.width * arg.height * screen.DEPTH ...  
4 }
```

Method type where receiver type must have two integer properties, x and y.

```
1 /*c {x: int, y: int}.(int, int) → boolean */  
2 Frame.prototype.layout = function (width, height) {  
3   ... this.x ... this.y ...  
4 }
```

# Random Testing from Type Contracts

- Observation (QuickCheck): Types are a good basis for generating random test data

# Random Testing from Type Contracts

- Observation (QuickCheck): Types are a good basis for generating random test data
- Type contracts are just as good
- Contracts in negative positions serve as generators; contracts in positive positions serve as checkers

## Example for Random Testing

```
1 /*c (int,int) → bool */  
2 function p(x,y) {  
3   if (x != y) {  
4     if (f(x) == x + 10) return "false"; // contract violation  
5   };  
6   return true;  
7 };
```

For testing this function, the context needs to provide a pair of integers and needs to check the return value for a boolean.



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```

For testing this function, the context needs to provide a pair of integers and needs to check the return value for a boolean.

### Pitfall

What is the probability that random testing finds the problem?

# Pitfall for Random Testing

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3   if (x != y) {  
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6   return true;  
7 };
```

- random generator for int uniformly distributed
- ⇒  $P(x = 10) \approx 2^{-32}$
- ⇒ uniformly distributed generators are not always a good choice

# Guided Random Testing

```
1 /*c (int@numbers,int) → bool */  
2 function p(x,y) {  
3   if (x != y) {  
4     if (f(x) == x + 10) return "false"; // contract violation  
5   };  
6   return true;  
7 };
```

Annotate the int contract with @numbers.

# Guided Random Testing

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```

Annotate the int contract with @numbers.

- ⇒ Changes the probability distribution
- ⇒ Generates random expressions with numbers from the source program
- ⇒ Usually locates the violation in less than 10 test runs
- ⇒ Highly effective also for more complicated conditions

# Guided Contract for Objects

```
1 /*c (object@labels) → bool */  
2 function h(x) {  
3   if (x && x.p && x.quest)  
4     return "false"; // contract violation  
5   return true;  
6 };
```

- Random generation of objects; presence of particular labels unlikely

# Guided Contract for Objects

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1 /*c (object@labels) → bool */  
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3   if (x && x.p && x.quest)  
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6 };
```

- Random generation of objects; presence of particular labels unlikely
  - Annotation @labels
  - Generator prefers to use the labels inside of the function body
- ⇒ Raises probability to generate a property with names p or quest; locates the violation

## Effects: Access Permission Contracts

- Type contracts are not sufficiently expressive
- Effect of operation describes the locations read and written by it
- Expressed by **access permission contract**

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### Access Permission

- Abstraction of a set of access paths
- Syntax: file path with wildcards, components are property names



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## Access Permission

- Abstraction of a set of access paths
- Syntax: file path with wildcards, components are property names

## ... Contract

- comes with dynamic monitoring
- **see** `http://proglang.informatik.uni-freiburg.de/jscontest/`

# Example: Add Node to Singly-Linked List

How does this operation affect the object graph?

```
1 function add(data) {  
2     var node = {data: data, next: null}, current;  
3     if (this._head === null) {  
4         this._head = node;  
5     } else {  
6         current = this._head;  
7         while(current.next) { current = current.next; }  
8         current.next = node;  
9     }  
10    this._length++;  
11 }
```

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- Reads and writes this.\_head and this.\_length.

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- Reads this.\_head.next...next and writes the last next property

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8         current.next = node;  
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10    this._length++;  
11 }
```

- Reads and writes this.\_head and this.\_length.
- Reads this.\_head.next...next and writes the last next property
- Does not access the data argument

# Example with Access Permission Contract

```
1  /*c {}.any) → undefined
2      with [this._head, this._head.next*.next, this._length] */
3  function add(data) {
4      var node = {data: data, next: null}, current;
5      if (this._head === null) {
6          this._head = node;
7      } else {
8          current = this._head;
9          while(current.next) { current = current.next; }
10         current.next = node;
11     }
12     this._length++;
13 }
```

# Effects for Singly-Linked List Library

- `add(data):`  
`this._head,`      `this._head.next*.next,`      `this._length`
- `item(index):`  
`this._length.@,`      `this._head.next*.next.@,`  
`this._head.next*.data.@`
- `remove(index):`  
`this._head.next*.data.@,`      `this._head.next*.next,`  
`this._length`
- `size():`  
`this._length.@`
- `toArray():`  
`this._head.next*.next.@`
- `toString():`  
`this._head.next*.next.@`

# Syntax of Access Permissions

$P \subseteq Prop, \quad p \in Prop$  properties

$b ::= \varepsilon \mid P.b \mid P * .b$  path permissions  
 $a ::= \emptyset \mid b \mid a + a$  access permissions

$\pi ::= \varepsilon \mid p.\pi$  access paths  
 $\gamma ::= \mathbf{R} \mid \mathbf{W}$  access classifiers  
 $\kappa ::= \gamma(\pi)$  classified access paths

$? = Prop, \quad @ = \emptyset \subseteq Prop$



# Path Semantics of Access Permissions

$\boxed{\gamma(\pi) \prec a}$  path  $\gamma(\pi)$  matches permission  $a$

$$\mathbf{W}(\varepsilon) \prec \varepsilon$$

$$\mathbf{R}(\varepsilon) \prec b$$

$$\frac{\gamma(\pi) \prec b \quad p \in P}{\gamma(p.\pi) \prec P.b}$$

$$\frac{\gamma(\pi) \prec b}{\gamma(\pi) \prec P*.b}$$

$$\frac{\gamma(\pi) \prec P*.b \quad p \in P}{\gamma(p.\pi) \prec P*.b}$$

$$\frac{\kappa \prec a_1}{\kappa \prec a_1 + a_2}$$

$$\frac{\kappa \prec a_2}{\kappa \prec a_1 + a_2}$$

$$\frac{(\forall \kappa \in K) \kappa \prec a}{K \prec a}$$

# Examples

- $\mathbf{W}(\text{this.head}) \prec \text{this.head}$
- $\mathbf{W}(\text{this.length}) \not\prec \text{this.length.@}$  because  $\mathbf{W}(\varepsilon) \not\prec @$
- $\mathbf{R}(\text{this.length}) \prec \text{this.length.@}$  because  $\mathbf{R}(\varepsilon) \prec @$

# Properties

1. If  $\mathbf{R}(\pi.p) \prec a$ , then  $\mathbf{R}(\pi) \prec a$   
Read permissions are closed under prefix.
2. If  $\mathbf{W}(\pi.p) \prec a$ , then  $\mathbf{R}(\pi) \prec a$   
The initial segment of a write permission yields read permission.
3.  $\mathbf{W}(\pi) \not\prec b.@$   
A path permission ending in @ indicates read-only access.

# All Settled?

- At this point, the issue seems settled.
- The semantics of an access path seems obvious and intuitive.
- Is it?

# Interpretation of Paths

```
1 /*c (obj, obj) → any with [x.b,y.a] */  
2 function h(x, y) {  
3   y.a = 1;  
4   y.b = 2; // violation?  
5 }  
6 // entry point #1  
7 function h1() {  
8   var o = { a: -1, b: -2 };  
9   h(o, o);  
10 }  
11 // entry point #2  
12 function h2() {  
13   h({ a: -1, b: -2 }, { a: -1, b: -2 });  
14 }
```

# Design Space for Semantics I

Path-dependent access  
vs.  
Location-dependent access

## Path-Dependent Access

*An access permission grants the right to read or modify a property of an object depending on the actual traversal path through which the object has been reached.*

- ⇒ For each access, there is a unique path that determines the access rights.
- ⇒  $h1()$  and  $h2()$  both lead to violation

# Location-Dependent Access

*An access permission attaches the right to read or modify a property of an object to its location.*

- ⇒ For each access, there may be a number of paths in the permission that contribute to the access rights.
- ⇒  $h1()$  is accepted because  $y.b$  is an alias of  $x.b$ , but  $h2()$  leads to a violation.
- ⇒ Violation is not stable



# Design Space for Semantics, II

Dynamic Extent  
vs.  
Lexical Extent

# Example I

```
1 /*c (obj) → any with [x.a] */  
2 function d1(x) {  
3     return x.a; // violation if called from d2  
4 }  
5 /*c (obj) → any with [] */  
6 function d2(x) {  
7     return d1(x);  
8 }
```

# Example I

```
1 /*c (obj) → any with [x.a] */  
2 function d1(x) {  
3     return x.a; // violation if called from d2  
4 }  
5 /*c (obj) → any with [] */  
6 function d2(x) {  
7     return d1(x);  
8 }
```

- dynamic extent: the restriction imposed by contract on d2 carries over to d1
- lexical extent: ?

## Example II

```
1 /*c (obj) → (() → any) with [x.b] */
2 function f(x) {
3     return function() { return x.a + "" + x.b; };
4 }
5 function f1() {
6     var r = f({ a: "secret", b: "revealed" });
7     return r();
8 }
```

## Example II

```
1 /*c (obj) → (() → any) with [x.b] */  
2 function f(x) {  
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```

- dynamic extent: no violation
- lexical extent: reading x.a triggers violation

## Example II

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7   return r();  
8 }
```

- dynamic extent: no violation
- lexical extent: reading x.a triggers violation
- If x.a should not be read, this contract is more appropriate

```
1 /*c (obj) → (() → any with [x.b]) with [x.b] */
```

## Design Space for Semantics, III

### Pre-State Snapshot

*An access permission only applies to objects and paths in the heap at the time when the contract is installed.*

# Alternatives to Pre-State Snapshot?

## Candidates for Reference Heaps

- pre-state  
consistent with verification approaches (precondition)
- current state  
“symbolic” interpretation of access paths
- post-state  
???



# Symbolic Interpretation of Access Paths

```
1 /*c (obj, obj) → any with [x.a, y.a, y.a.b] */  
2 function b(x, y) {  
3   y.a = x.a;  
4   y.a.b = 42; // allowed?  
5 }
```

# Symbolic Interpretation of Access Paths

```
1 /*c (obj, obj) → any with [x.a, y.a, y.a.b] */  
2 function b(x, y) {  
3   y.a = x.a;  
4   y.a.b = 42; // allowed?  
5 }
```

- Expectation: x.a.b does not change
- Admitted by symbolic interpretation: inconsistent with verification

# Design Space for Semantics, IV

## Sticky Update

*A property assignment keeps the access paths of the value on its right-hand side.*

# Consequence of Sticky Update

```
1 /*c (obj) → any with [x.a,x.b.a] */  
2 function l(x) {  
3   x.a = x.b;  
4   x.a.a = 42;  
5 }  
6 function l1() {  
7   var x = { a: {}, b: {} };  
8   l(x);  
9 }
```

Is there a violation?

# Design Choices in JSContest

## Objective: Partial Specifications

- Path-dependent access
- Dynamic extent
- Pre-state snapshot
- Sticky update

Choices consistent with static analysis (effect systems) and static verification (c.f. dynamic frame rule by Smans et al)

# Alternative Design Choices

## Objective: Security

Different choices seem advantageous

- location-based semantics
- lexical extent (?)
- access **restrictions** instead of permissions  
i.e., guarantee no access to window.location

## Side Remark: Efficiency

### Path-Dependent Access

- references need to be paired with path information
- checking a permission:  $O(\# \text{installed permissions})$
- installing a permission:  $O(1)$

### Location-Dependent Access

- separate data structure for rights management
- checking:  $O(1)$
- installing a permission: (multiple) heap traversals; does that amortize?

# Technical Development

## Big-step evaluation judgment

$$\rho, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W} \vdash H; u; e \hookrightarrow H'; u'; v$$

- $\rho$  environment
- $\mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W}$  read and write permissions
- $H, H'$  heap
- $u, u'$  time stamp
- $e$  expression
- $v$  return value



## Two rules

PERMIT

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \rho', \mathcal{R}[u \mapsto L_r], \mathcal{W}[u \mapsto L_w] \vdash H; u + 1; e \hookrightarrow H'; u'; v \\ \rho' = \rho[x \mapsto \rho(x) \triangleleft [u \mapsto \varepsilon]] \end{array}}{\rho, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W} \vdash H; u; \text{permit } x : L_r, L_w \text{ in } e \hookrightarrow H'; u'; v}$$

GET

$$\frac{\rho, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W} \vdash H; u; e \hookrightarrow H'; u'; (\ell, \mathcal{M}) \quad \mathcal{R} \vdash_{\text{chk}} \mathcal{M}.p}{\rho, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W} \vdash H; u; e.p \hookrightarrow H'; u'; \mathcal{M}.p \oplus H'(\ell)(p)}$$

# Theorem: Soundness

- Reference value  $::= \text{Location} \times \text{PMap}$
- PMap  $::= \text{Stamp} \rightarrow \text{AccessPath}$

## Theorem

For each reference value, the access path information is correct with respect to its corresponding pre-state heap.

## Theorem: Stability of Violation

- If running a program on a given heap raises a violation, then it also raises a violation on a heap in which more locations are aliased.
- If running a program produces a result on a given heap, then it also produces a result on a heap with less aliasing.

## Theorem: Stability of Violation

- If running a program on a given heap raises a violation, then it also raises a violation on a heap in which more locations are aliased.
- If running a program produces a result on a given heap, then it also produces a result on a heap with less aliasing.
- \* Unless the program depends on an update to a shared object.

# Theorem: Completeness

All accesses through a variable with an access permission contract can only occur via permitted paths.

# Implementation

- By transformation of JavaScript code
- Slowdown by a factor of 4–4.4
- Problems: Interfacing with non-transformed code (e.g., library code)
- Large subset of JavaScript supported
- Exceptions: prototype accesses, with statements, eval
- Goal: implementation in browser / JavaScript engine evades these problems

# Evaluation

- Question: effectiveness of access permissions for detecting programming errors
- Method
  - Hand-annotated code run with monitoring
  - Random code modifications
  - Check if modifications detected

# Singly-Linked Lists: 6.4% More Errors Detected

	type		type+effect	
fulfilled contracts	1011	18.0 %	711	12.7 %
rejected contracts	4607	82.0 %	4907	87.3 %
reason for rejection (a mutant may be counted multiple times)				
type contract failure	2020	43.9 %	1643	33.5 %
signaled error	2034	44.1 %	2136	43.5 %
browser timeout	553	12.0 %	243	5.0 %
read violation	-	0.0 %	1018	20.7 %
write violation	-	0.0 %	1606	32.7 %
read/write violation	-	0.0 %	1842	37.5 %



# Richards Benchmark: 13% More Errors Detected

	type		type + effect	
fulfilled contracts	1148	38.9%	911	30.8%
rejected contracts	1807	61.1%	2044	69.2%
reason for rejection (a mutant may be counted multiple times)				
type contract failure	872	48.3%	866	42.4%
signaled error	1052	58.2%	1037	50.7%
browser timeout	28	1.5%	30	1.5%
read violation	0	0.0%	202	9.9%
write violation	0	0.0%	149	7.4%
read/write violation	0	0.0%	349	17.1%

# Effect Inference

- Where do effects come from?
- For program understand, an automated approach is advantageous.

# Sampling

- Program run of a JavaScript program → list of classified access paths
- Example (for add, typically several 1000):

`R(_head)`

`R(_head)`

`R(_head.next)`

`R(_head.next)`

`R(_head.next.next)`

`R(_head.next.next)`


`R(_head.next.next.next)`

`W(_head.next.next.next)`

`R(_length)`


`W(_length)`

# Example: Structure Derived from Effects



# Implementation of Sampling

- Source-to-source transformation of the JavaScript program
- Instruments each property read and write operation
- Annotates objects with path information (anchor and access path)
- Implemented using wrapper objects
- Path set stored in a trie



# Hypothesis of the heuristic

Intuition drawn from list and tree datatypes

## Hypothesis

Permissions have one of the forms

- $p_1 \dots p_n.P*.q_1 \dots q_m$
- $p_1 \dots p_n$

for property names  $p_i$  and  $q_j$  and a property set  $P$ .

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## Need to identify ...

- common prefixes
- set of middle properties
- common suffixes

# Overall inference algorithm

Only for read paths

**Input**  $\Pi^r$  set of all read paths

- Determine interesting prefixes

$$\Pi'_0 \leftarrow \text{Prefixes}(\Pi^r)$$

- Infer permissions

$$R \leftarrow \text{Permissions}(\text{Reduct}(\Pi'_0), \Pi^r, sl, sd)$$

- Simplify permissions

$$\text{Simplify}(R)$$

**Output**  $R.@$



## Interesting Prefixes

Recall the read paths of the add example:

`R(_head)`

`R(_head.next)`

`R(_head.next.next)`

`R(_head.next.next.next)`

`R(_length)`

## Interesting Prefixes

Recall the read paths of the add example:

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The interesting prefixes are `_head` and `_length`. **Why?**

## Interesting Prefixes

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
The interesting prefixes are `_head` and `_length`. **Why?**

A prefix is interesting if ...

- traversing it *changes* the set of accessible symbols
- extending it *does not change* the set of accessible symbols


# Determining Interesting Prefixes

Prefix:  $\epsilon$




Accessible symbols: `_head`, `_length`, `next`

Prefix: `_length`



Accessible symbols:  $\emptyset$

Prefix: `_head`



Accessible symbols `next`

# From Interesting Prefix to Permission

# From Interesting Prefix to Permission

- Interesting prefixes partition the set of paths  $\Pi^r$
- For each prefix  $\pi$  determine a permission by extending from the 1-suffixes of the quotient  $\pi \setminus \Pi^r$ 
  - $\_length \setminus \Pi^r = \{\varepsilon\}$   
yields permission  $\_length$
  - $\_head \setminus \Pi^r = \{\varepsilon, next, next.next, next.next.next\}$   
yields permissions  $\_head$  and  $\_head.next*.next$

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yields permissions  $\_head$  and  $\_head.next*.next$
- Simplification and making readonly yields  
 $\_length.@$  and  $\_head.next*.@$

# Papers

- Contract-driven Testing of JavaScript Code, TOOLS 2010
- A Heuristic Approach for Computing Effects, TOOLS 2011
- Access Permission Contracts for Scripting Languages, POPL 2012



## Conclusions

- JsConTest: Contracts and random testing for JS
- Access permission contracts extend the scope of contracts and monitoring to side effects
- Access permissions fit in with static verification
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- Browser instrumentation
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- Location-dependent access for security

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<http://proglang.informatik.uni-freiburg.de/jscontest/>

## Further Examples

- Layout computation

```
/*c { }. (int, int) → boolean with [this.x, this.y, this.w, this.h] */  
Frame.prototype.layout = function (width, height) { ... }
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- Objects may be used for keyword parameters:

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c = createCanvas({width: 100, height: 200, background: "green"});
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The parameter object should be read-only:

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- Observer pattern

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/*c ({} ) → any with [$1.state.*.?] */
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Observer.prototype.update =  
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- Forbid access to a specific property

```
/*c ... with [window./^(?!status)./] */
```